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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington1 has 
significantly changed the status quo regarding the types of state-
ments that may come into evidence in criminal trials. Inculpatory 
out-of-court statements that a prosecutor could once count on to be 
admitted against a defendant at trial through various hearsay excep-
tions are now being suppressed. The government is in damage-
control mode, and defense lawyers are pushing to find out just how 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. Professor 
Seigel would like to acknowledge his co-author for conceiving the basic idea that led to the 
proposal put forth in this Article and for all of his hard work on seeing the project through 
to a successful conclusion. 
 ** J.D. candidate, December 2007, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of 
Law. Author Weisman greatly appreciates the help of the prosecutors at the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida (Gainesville) in developing his legal 
abilities through their teaching and leadership. He also extends his thanks to his coauthor 
for recognizing the potential of this piece. 
 1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  Crawford is discussed at length in this Article. It essentially 
held that where “testimonial” evidence is at issue, the Constitution demands that before 
the government can introduce out-of-court statements against an accused, it must be 
shown that (1) the witness is unavailable and (2) the defendant had a previous opportunity 
to cross-examine him. 
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much more protection the Confrontation Clause2 will afford their cli-
ents. Courts are being forced to reexamine the constitutional validity 
of hearsay exceptions long thought to be “firmly rooted.” 3 In addition 
to its far-reaching holding, the Crawford opinion reverberated with 
obiter dictum reflecting suspicions of both hearsay declarants and 
the law enforcement personnel who coax them into speaking.4
 The majority in Crawford, perhaps stung by the dissent’s criticism 
that the opinion’s paradigm shift would result in a widespread and 
ultimately inefficacious doctrinal upheaval,5 understandably sought 
to calm the nerves of practitioners and lower courts by offering reas-
surances that most prior cases approving the receipt of evidence un-
der existing hearsay exceptions would remain good law—in outcome 
if not in their reasoning. Indeed, the Court went even further and ac-
tually named some nontestimonial hearsay exceptions in an appar-
ent attempt to leave no doubt about their status. One category of ex-
ceptions to receive such “bright-line” treatment was co-conspirator 
statements, such as those admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence (FRE) 801(d)(2)(E) or a state equivalent.6 In short, the Court 
went out of its way to make clear that statements made by a defen-
 
 2. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.” 
 3. This terminology, of course, comes from the doctrinal regime overthrown by Craw-
ford, found in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and its progeny. One district court even 
stated, “Crawford v. Washington . . . has superseded the Federal Rules of Evidence in bar-
ring all out-of-court statements made by an unavailable witness whom a defendant has not 
had the chance to cross examine, with exceptions only for dying declarations and forfeiture 
by wrongdoing.” United States v. Hendricks, No. CRIM.2004-05 F/R, 2004 WL 1125143, at 
*1 (D. Virgin Islands Apr. 27, 2004), rev’d, 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005). Although this ex-
treme evidentiary ruling was later overturned by the Third Circuit, it is still a good exam-
ple of the chaos occurring in lower courts as they try to apply Crawford to the myriad ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule.  
 4. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to gov-
ernment officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to 
an acquaintance does not.”); see also id. at 53 (“The involvement of government officers in 
the production of testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are po-
lice or justices of the peace.”).  
 5. See id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he thousands of federal prosecu-
tors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors need answers . . . [as to what is “tes-
timonial”] now, not months or years from now. Rules of criminal evidence are applied 
every day in courts throughout the country, and parties should not be left in the dark in 
this manner.”). 
 6. The co-conspirator exception is based on principles of agency. As Judge Learned 
Hand once stated, “When men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become 
ad hoc agents for one another, and have made a ‘partnership in crime.’ What one does pur-
suant to their common purpose, all do, and, as declarations may be such acts, they are 
competent against all.” Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 188 (1987) (citing Van 
Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926)). The FRE exclude co-conspirator 
statements from the definition of hearsay in Rule 801(d) rather than treat them as excep-
tions to the rule in Rule 803. This is, however, a mere semantic difference, and this Article 
will use the common parlance of “hearsay exception” when referring to such statements. 
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dant’s co-conspirators during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy—so vital to the prosecution of sophisticated drug rings, 
corporate and white collar crime, public corruption, and other law en-
forcement priorities of the twenty-first century—would still be ad-
missible against the defendant. 
 Almost without exception, lower courts have followed the Su-
preme Court’s lead.7 In the several years since Crawford was handed 
down, every court of appeals to consider the issue has determined 
that co-conspirator statements are not testimonial. They have come 
to this conclusion either by applying one of the definitions for “testi-
monial” set out in Crawford or by looking to the pertinent dicta in 
that opinion. As a result, the “bright line” rule of admission for co-
conspirator statements that the Crawford majority apparently de-
sired has come to fruition. 
 Drawing bright lines in the law can be extremely desirable; they 
are an exceptionally efficient way of dividing cases in accordance 
with policy goals. However, the efficiency of a bright line rule is coun-
terproductive if the rule is divorced from the underlying policy it is 
supposed to serve. We contend that the latter situation exists in this 
instance. In short, the Supreme Court was too quick to suggest, and 
the lower courts have been too quick to hold, that co-conspirator 
statements can never be testimonial for Confrontation Clause pur-
poses. Indeed, if one examines the test for what constitutes “testi-
mony” that the Court began to define in Crawford and continued to 
flesh out in the later case of Davis v. Washington,8 it becomes clear that 
this categorical approach to co-conspirator statements is erroneous.  
 This Article takes the position that co-conspirator statements 
must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they 
are testimonial and thus subject to exclusion under the Confronta-
tion Clause. This position is supported by (1) the language of Craw-
ford itself, (2) the Supreme Court’s own interpretation of Crawford in 
Davis, and (3) a careful application of the interests that ought to be 
protected by the Confrontation Clause. Further, in light of the fact 
that the author of the majority opinions in Crawford and Davis was 
Justice Antonin Scalia, this Article examines whether interpreting 
the Sixth Amendment as a bar to the admission of certain co-
conspirator statements would violate an originalist interpretation of 
that provision.9 The conclusion reached is that it would not. 
 
 7. One authority notes that courts have “rushed” to declare co-conspirator state-
ments nontestimonial. See 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6371.2 n.174 (Supp. 2006); see also infra notes 108-
27 and accompanying text. 
 8. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
 9. See infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.  
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 The Article does not stop with a mere claim that case-by-case 
analysis is warranted. Rather, it proceeds to propose the requisite 
methodology. In a nutshell, given the Supreme Court’s identification 
of the key characteristics of “testimonial” statements, particularly as 
described in its Davis opinion, a co-conspirator statement will fit that 
definition whenever (1) it is made to an undercover agent or other 
undercover operative acting under the supervision of law enforce-
ment and (2) the statement is the product of sustained questioning 
by the undercover operative designed to elicit information from the 
co-conspirator about past criminal activity. In other words, the 
statement fits the definition if the conversation amounts to govern-
ment interrogation of an unwitting witness. 
 Part II of this Article provides a brief preliminary history of the 
development of both the Confrontation Clause and the co-conspirator 
exception to the hearsay rule. Though these historical recitations 
have become relatively ubiquitous,10 we believe some foundation is 
necessary to support our later analysis. This Part includes a review 
of the Crawford opinion and a summary of the scholarly commentary 
it spawned. In Part III, we examine in some detail the response of 
state and lower federal courts to the Crawford decision, specifically fo-
cusing on their application of Crawford to co-conspirator statements. 
Part IV begins with an analysis of the recent Davis decision, which 
sheds much additional light on the meaning of “testimonial” in the con-
text of police interrogations, and continues with an examination of the 
places where interrogation and co-conspirator statements intersect.  
 The heart of the Article is Part V, wherein we set out and defend 
our proposed test for determining when co-conspirator statements 
ought to be excluded on confrontation grounds. In Part VI, we engage 
in originalist analysis, not because we are necessarily proponents of 
it, but because Justice Scalia is. Thus, we think it necessary to estab-
lish that his favored analytical approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion is not an impediment to the adoption of our proposal. In Part 
VII, we apply our proposed test to the facts of several important co-
conspirator statement cases, including United States v. Stewart,11 to 
demonstrate its operation. Part VIII is a brief conclusion.  
 
 10. See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation 
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 568-86 
(1992); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1011, 1022-26 (1998); John Robert Knoebber, Say That to My Face: Applying an Objective 
Approach to Determine the Meaning of Testimony in Light of Crawford v. Washington, 51 
LOY. L. REV. 497, 501-02 (2005); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36, 43-50 (2004). 
 11. 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006).  This case involved the prosecution of Martha Stewart 
for making false statements to government officials, as well as other charges.    
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II.   CONFRONTATION AND THE CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION: 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 The admissibility of an out-of-court statement against a criminal 
defendant that would otherwise be excluded as hearsay because it 
was made by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the con-
spiracy is a principle deeply embedded in American jurisprudence. 
To understand why, a short review of confrontation, hearsay, and the 
co-conspirator exception is required. 
A.   Confrontation 
 The right of an accused to confront witnesses against him at trial 
dates back at least to Roman times,12 but in a more modern setting it 
developed in England during the early seventeenth century.13 Most 
historical authorities agree that it came into demand in the English 
system at least in part from the backlash following the trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh,14 which has gone down in infamy.15 Raleigh was 
tried for treason based upon statements that were obtained from one 
of his alleged co-conspirators, Lord Cobham.16 Judicial officials ob-
tained these statements from Cobham outside Raleigh’s presence, 
and they were later offered verbatim as evidence against him.17 Ra-
leigh insisted that if the court would just produce18 his accuser for 
questioning, he could make Cobham recant19—but the court re-
 
 12. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988). 
 13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (2004).  
 14. Reference to the Raleigh trial in cases and authorities is prolific, and the authori-
ties generally agree that Raleigh’s trial was a factor in the development of confrontation 
law, but to what extent is debated. Compare Erwin N. Griswold, The Due Process Revolu-
tion and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 712 (1971) (citing Raleigh as the “historical 
origin” of the Confrontation Clause), with Michael Graham, The Right of Confrontation 
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100 n.4 
(1972) (referring to Raleigh’s impact on confrontation as being “a convenient but highly 
romantic myth”). 
 15. One of the judges in Raleigh’s case later lamented that “the justice of England has 
never been so degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.” Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 44 (quoting 1 D. JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 435, 520 (1832)). 
 16. 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6342 n.549. 
 17. Id. at n.560 (“[T]he case against Raleigh was entirely based on a series of confes-
sions of Lord Cobham while he was being interrogated by some of the same judges who sat 
at Raleigh’s trial.”). 
 18. Id. at n.567. Raleigh said,  
But, my Lords, I claim to have my accuser brought here face to face to speak; . . . 
If you proceed to condemn me by bare inferences, without an oath, without a 
subscription, upon a paper accusation, you try me by the Spanish inquisition. If 
my accuser were dead or abroad, it were something; but he liveth, and is in this 
very house. Consider, my Lords, it is no rare case for a man to be falsely ac-
cused; aye, and falsely condemned too.   
Id., text at n.567. 
 19. The historical record suggests that Raleigh might have been right. See id. at n.562. 
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fused.20  Raleigh was then sentenced to death and later executed.21 
The result of this “trial” was a heightened awareness of confronta-
tion’s importance, which then took hold in English statutes and 
common law.22
 For all the reforms that were adopted in England, defendants in 
the American Colonies were not treated much differently than Sir 
Walter Raleigh.23 British courts trying Americans in violation of the 
Stamp Act24 and the Navigation Act25 routinely employed harsh 
methods to extract sworn statements from witnesses, which were 
then introduced against accused Colonists as unimpeachable evi-
dence.26 The American Colonies in turn raged against these heavy-
handed practices, and the historical record leaves little doubt that as 
a result they demanded a confrontation right be included in their 
fledgling Constitution.27
 Later, the Supreme Court unanimously held in 1965 that the Con-
frontation Clause was applicable to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment,28 and in doing so it said—as though merely reaffirming 
a presumption—that “[i]t cannot seriously be doubted at this late 
 
 20. Id. at n.580. The judge refused, relied on reasons of state to deny Raleigh confron-
tation, and said “I marvel, Sir Walter, that you being of such experience and wit, should 
stand on this point; for many horse-stealers would escape if they may not be condemned 
without witnesses.” Id., text at n.581. 
 21. Raleigh was sentenced to death, but that was not the end of the story. The follow-
ing passage says it best: 
Reprieved on the eve of execution, Raleigh spent 13 years in the Tower, writing 
a history of the world and puttering with alchemy. Paroled to go on a gold-
seeking expedition to Guyana that not only failed but raised the wrath of the 
Spanish, Raleigh was executed on the original sentence on October 29, 1618. 
Thus, in what may well be the most ironic moment in the history of the right of a 
confrontation, a man who had gained fame fighting the Spanish, then was con-
victed of conspiring with them against his own government, was finally put to 
death to satisfy their demands. It is a fitting close to this chapter of the story. 
Id. at nn.616-19 (internal citation omitted). 
 22. For a discussion of these reforms, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-45 
(2004). 
 23. See id. at 47-48 (“Controversial examination practices were also used in the colo-
nies.”). See generally 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6344, text at n.564.  
 24. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47-48. 
 25. 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6345 n.509. 
 26. These extrajudicial statements, sometimes referred to as “ex-parte affidavits,” 
were often procured by torturous methods. See Robert M. Pitler, Crawford and Beyond: 
Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 
2-3 (2005). 
 27. See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6345 n.507 (setting forth a letter from 
George Mason). As noted, after excoriating the British for their civil-law ex-parte examina-
tions, Mason later became the author of the first American Confrontation Clause. Id., text 
at n.510.  Furthermore, at the 1788 Massachusetts convention to decide whether or not to 
ratify the Federal Constitution, it was said that omission of the right to confrontation 
would pave the way for future governments to resemble “a certain tribunal in Spain . . . the 
Inquisition.” See Pitler, supra note 26, at 3 n.7. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
2007]                         CO-CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS 883 
 
                                                                                                                   
date that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an 
accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him.”29  
B.   Co-Conspirator Statements 
 Although the hearsay exception for co-conspirator statements ex-
isted in American common law in 1791,30 it was not squarely ap-
proved by the Supreme Court until 1827.31 John Gooding, owner of 
the vessel General Winder, went on trial for violation of the Slave 
Trading Act.32 The indictment alleged that he knowingly outfitted his 
boat, hired a captain and crew, and dispatched the vessel for the 
purpose of procuring Africans and taking them to Cuba and the West 
Indies for sale as slaves, in contravention of the Act.33 The Govern-
ment sought to introduce conversations between Captain Hill, who 
Gooding had hired to run the ship, and another man named Coit, 
whom Hill was attempting to hire as a ship’s mate. The conversa-
tions laid out the general slave-trading operation and the payment 
plan and named the defendant as being the overall master.34 The de-
fense objected to the introduction of this testimony, arguing in es-
sence that the theory of imputing statements made by an authorized 
agent to the principal should only apply in civil cases, not criminal 
ones.35 Rejecting this claim, Justice Story articulated the idea that 
once a conspiracy is established, the acts of each conspirator are con-
sidered acts by all of them and are evidence against them all.36 Thus, 
the groundwork was laid in case law for the co-conspirator exception, 
which was—for better or worse—based on agency theory.37  
 The co-conspirator exception has been attacked on appeal fre-
quently over the years, which has resulted in a few points of settled 
law. First, the prosecutor has the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that (1) there was a conspiracy, (2) the defen-
dant and the declarant were involved in it, and (3) the statements 
were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.38 Second, 
“during” the conspiracy, according to the FRE (as construed by the 
Supreme Court), means that once the criminal aim of the conspiracy 
 
 29. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). 
 30. Patton v. Freeman, 1 N.J.L. 113 (1791). Note, however, that the contour of the ex-
ception as it existed in 1791 is open to further analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 
193-95. 
 31. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460 (1827).  
 32. Id. at 461-64. The Act referred to was the Slave Trading Act of the 20th of April, 1818. 
 33. Id. at 461-62. 
 34. Id. at 464.  
 35. Id. at 469. 
 36. Id.  
 37. This was as opposed to any innate reliability, like most other hearsay exceptions. 
See David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in 
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1384 (1972).  
 38. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). 
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terminates, the conspiracy is over, and statements made thereafter 
during attempts to conceal the conspiracy are inadmissible.39 Finally, 
determining whether the prosecutor has met his burden is within the 
province of the judge,40 who may consider the hearsay statement it-
self, but the statement alone is not sufficient to establish the con-
spiracy.41
C.   Confrontation and Hearsay: Preliminary History 
 A literal application of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause would operate to bar all hearsay, but the Court has never in-
terpreted this to be the Framers’ intent.42 The Court’s rejection of 
such a broad reading is supported by the fact that many of the hear-
say exceptions in existence at common law in 1791 were left undis-
turbed by the courts after the Sixth Amendment’s adoption. In 
Mattox v. United States,43 the Court addressed whether the Confron-
tation Clause was violated when the trial court allowed statements 
from two deceased witnesses (who had testified against the defen-
dant at his own previous trial) to be read into evidence.44 The Court 
marshaled the weight of common law authority and affirmed the 
conviction, agreeing that “the right of cross-examination having once 
been exercised, it was no hardship upon the defendant to allow the 
testimony of the deceased witness to be read.”45 In dicta, Mattox also 
referenced the dying declaration exception as being a good reason not to 
read the Confrontation Clause too strictly, because dying declarations 
had been recognized as competent evidence “from time immemorial.”46  
 For more than a half century after Mattox, the Supreme Court 
continued to struggle with drawing a line between confrontation-
barred and admissible hearsay. Finally, in the landmark 1980 deci-
 
 39. Federal prosecutors have fought unavailingly to expand the window of time dur-
ing which these statements must be made if they are to fall within the exception, but the 
Supreme Court—wary of the “far-reaching results” that would come from expanding the 
co-conspirator exception too greatly—has always read FRE 801(d)(2)(e) as only conferring 
admissibility on statements made up until the point at which the criminal aim of the con-
spiracy has been achieved. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444 (1949). No-
tably, in 1970, the Court had the opportunity to strike down a state co-conspirator excep-
tion which did admit statements made during the “concealment phase,” but declined to do 
so. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). In this manner, the FRE may be slightly more 
favorable to a defendant than the Sixth Amendment demands.  
 40. It is a preliminary decision made by the judge under FRE 104(a). Bourjaily, 483 
U.S. at 175.  
 41. This concept is more informally known as “bootstrapping.” For a more thorough 
discussion of this concept, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).  
 42. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (noting that such a point of view has 
been “long rejected as unintended and too extreme”). 
 43. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
 44. Id. at 240. 
 45. Id. at 242. 
 46. Id. at 243.  
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sion Ohio v. Roberts,47 the Court appeared to set itself on a solid 
path. The Court sketched an overarching blueprint for analyzing 
whether introduction of hearsay evidence offends the Confrontation 
Clause: first, the declarant must be unavailable; second, the state-
ment in question must exhibit sufficient “indicia of reliability.”48 
Reliability could be proven by showing that the statement falls 
within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or has “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”49
 Two post-Roberts cases dealt specifically with co-conspirator 
statements. The first was United States v. Inadi.50 In Inadi, the de-
fendant and a crew of unindicted co-conspirators were involved in a 
scheme to manufacture and sell methamphetamine.51 Local police 
and the DEA began investigating in May 1980, and eventually five 
telephone conversations between co-conspirators were lawfully inter-
cepted and taped. These conversations were later introduced at trial 
over the defendant’s objection as co-conspirator statements under FRE 
801(d)(2)(E), and he was convicted.52 The Supreme Court held that 
where otherwise qualifying co-conspirator statements are at issue, the 
government need not demonstrate the declarant’s unavailability.53   
 In Bourjaily v. United States,54 the prosecution introduced re-
corded conversations between the defendant’s co-conspirator and a 
government informant at trial. After being convicted and receiving a 
fifteen-year sentence that was confirmed on appeal, Bourjaily suc-
cessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court held 
that because the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule was 
firmly rooted, trial courts need not make an inquiry into a co-
conspirator statement’s independent indicia of reliability before de-
 
 47. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 48. Id. at 65-66. 
 49. Id. at 66. 
 50. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
 51. Id. at 389.  
 52. Id. at 390-91. 
 53. Id. at 391. The Court then went on to distinguish why unavailability was required 
in the line of cases dealing with introduction of prior testimony, but should not be required 
for the introduction of co-conspirator statements. One key difference, according to the 
Court, was that whereas prior testimony was almost always disfavored as a “weaker sub-
stitute for live testimony,” co-conspirator statements are made in the very context of the 
criminal enterprise that the fact-finder seeks to explore, making them indispensable. Id. at 
394-95. The Court drove the final nail into the coffin when it reasoned that such an un-
availability rule would accomplish very little and simultaneously impose great burdens on 
the prosecution. Id. at 396-99.  
Despite a strong dissent by Justice Marshall, id. at 401-11, the 7-2 majority concluded 
that it would “continue to affirm the validity of the use of co-conspirator statements, and . . . de-
cline to require a showing of the declarant’s unavailability as a prerequisite to their admis-
sion.” Id. at 400.   
 54. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).    
886  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:877 
 
                                                                                                                   
ciding that the Confrontation Clause does not warrant its exclu-
sion.55  
 Taken together, Inadi and Bourjaily added up to the categorical 
acceptance of co-conspirator statements under Roberts’ framework 
for interpreting the Confrontation Clause.  
D.   Paradigm Shift: Crawford v. Washington 
 On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford was arrested for the nonfa-
tal stabbing of Kenneth Lee. Crawford had sought Lee out and 
stabbed him in the latter’s apartment because Lee allegedly tried to 
rape Crawford’s wife.56 The police arrested Crawford later that night 
and interrogated both him and his wife Sylvia.57 Crawford’s version 
of events implied that it may have been a case of self-defense, but 
Sylvia’s version, while substantially similar, indicated that the vic-
tim may not have actually had a weapon.58 Her statement to that ef-
fect was tape-recorded, and after Michael invoked the marital privi-
lege to prevent her from testifying at trial, the State offered her 
statement pursuant to Washington’s hearsay exception for state-
ments made against penal interest.59 The trial court, finding that the 
statement possessed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” 
admitted the statement over Crawford’s Confrontation Clause objec-
tion, and he was convicted of assault.60 The Washington Court of Ap-
peals applied its own nine-factor test to determine trustworthiness 
and reversed.61 Then, the Washington Supreme Court examined the 
statements yet again and determined that, because of their interlock-
ing nature, the conviction should be reinstated.62
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in a 7-2 ma-
jority opinion delivered by Justice Scalia.63 Justice Scalia set forth 
the facts of the case, laid out the historical context that brought 
about the inclusion of the Confrontation Clause within the Sixth 
Amendment, and made two inferences from this history. First, Jus-
tice Scalia claimed history showed that the Confrontation Clause was 
aimed at barring the use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused, such as were employed in the Raleigh trial.64 
Second, Justice Scalia asserted that the Framers would have rejected 
 
 55. Id. at 183-84. 
 56. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 38-40.  
 59. Id. at 40. Apparently she exposed herself to criminal liability as an accomplice by 
showing Michael where her alleged rapist lived. 
 60. Id. at 40-41.  
 61. Id. at 41. 
 62. Id. at 41-42. 
 63. Id. at 42. 
 64. Id. at 50-53. 
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the admission of testimonial statements unless the declarant was 
unavailable for trial and the defendant had a previous opportunity 
for cross-examination.65  
 The majority contended that the reliability doctrine set out in 
Roberts and elaborated in its progeny was misguided and, as a result, 
the Court had been generally arriving at the right answers for the 
wrong reasons.66 Furthermore (and worse), lower courts had been 
applying Roberts’ reliability standard haphazardly, sometimes reach-
ing the wrong results.67 Ultimately, the Court held, “[w]here testimo-
nial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the 
common law [of 1791] required: unavailability and a prior opportu-
nity for cross-examination.”68  The Court further held that state-
ments elicited from “police interrogations” are clearly testimonial69 
and that Sylvia’s interaction with the police qualified as an interro-
gation “under any conceivable definition.”70  
 Although leaving “for another day any effort to spell out a com-
prehensive definition of ‘testimonial,’” the Court provided some 
clues.71 It set forth three possibilities: (1) ex parte in-court testimony 
or its functional equivalent that declarants would reasonably expect 
to be used prosecutorially,72 (2) extrajudicial statements contained in 
formalized testimonial materials,73 and (3) statements made under 
circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to be-
 
 65. Id. at 53-56. 
 66. Id. at 60. 
 67. Id. at 63.  
 68. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).  The Court left open the question whether nontesti-
monial out-of-court statements would still be subject to the Roberts test. 541 U.S. at 61 
(noting that it did not need to address what confrontation analysis would apply, if any, to 
nontestimonial statements). It answered this question in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 
2266, 2274 (2006), where it held that the Confrontation Clause’s sole concern is testimonial 
statements, declaring that testimonial statements constituted “not merely [the] ‘core,’ but 
[the] perimeter” of the Confrontation Clause. 
 69. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The term “testimonial” applies “at a minimum to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations.”  
 70. Id. at 53 n.4. 
 71. Id. at 68.  
 72. Id. at 51-52. This was Mr. Fisher’s proposed definition in his brief on behalf of Mi-
chael Crawford, and it included “affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that 
the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements.”  
 Interestingly, the idea that statements made “in contemplation of legal proceedings” are 
subject to the Confrontation Clause was actually advanced in 1992 by the government in 
an amicus brief to the Court in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). See id. at 364 (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 73. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (citing Justice Thomas’ concurrence in White, 502 
U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) and including 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions).  
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lieve that the statements would be available for use at a later trial.74 
In addition, the Court noted that testimonial statements clearly in-
clude “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a former trial; and . . . police interrogations. These are the mod-
ern practices with closest kinship to the abuses that had motivated 
the enactment of  the Confrontation Clause.”75
 Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the Crawford result, but 
disagreed with the majority’s decision to overrule Roberts, criticizing 
the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements 
as being “no better rooted in history than our current doctrine.”76 He 
contended that the case could have been properly decided by further 
application and refinement of the Roberts test.77 Justice Scalia con-
ceded that the Court could have allowed Roberts to continue govern-
ing testimonial statements and simply made its own “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness” determination in order to find Sylvia’s 
statements inadmissible.78 The way that the lower courts treated Syl-
via’s statements, however, had revealed to Justice Scalia and the major-
ity “a fundamental failure . . . to interpret the Constitution in a way that 
secures its intended constraint on judicial discretion.”79   
 In effect, the Chief Justice’s claim was that the majority’s ap-
proach, which distinguished “testimonial” from “nontestimonial” out-
of-court statements, would be just as vague and arbitrary as Roberts’ 
reliability test.  This claim caused Justice Scalia and the majority to 
react by suggesting that most pre-Crawford confrontation jurispru-
dence would survive despite the paradigm shift. The Crawford ma-
jority thus cited with approval the results in Ohio v. Roberts,80 Lilly 
v. Virginia,81 Bourjaily v. United States,82 White v. Illinois,83 and Lee 
v. Illinois.84 In addition, faithful to his originalist approach to this 
and other questions, Justice Scalia noted that there were recognized 
nontestimonial hearsay exceptions at the time the Confrontation 
Clause was enacted, with the plain implication being that these ex-
 
 74. Id. at 52. This definition was proposed by the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers as amicus curae, see id., and therefore it is not surprising that it is the 
broadest of the three definitions. 
 75. Id. at 68. 
 76. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 77. Id. at 76. 
 78. Id. at 60.  
 79. Id. at 67. 
 80. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 81. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).  
 82. 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
 83. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). It is worth noting that even though the Crawford Court cited 
White with approval, it did mention in a footnote that the admission of the child’s state-
ment to the policeman in that case was “arguably in tension” with its holding. Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 58 n.8. 
 84. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).  
2007]                         CO-CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS 889 
 
                                                                                                                   
ceptions should be recognized as nontestimonial today as well. These 
hearsay exceptions include business records and statements made in 
furtherance of a conspiracy.85
E.   Scholarly Commentary on the Definition of “Testimonial” 
 In the aftermath of Crawford, scholarly commentary erupted 
seeking to divine the essence of a testimonial statement.86 Generally, 
the analysis focused on one of three perspectives: the declarant’s in-
tent, the government’s involvement, or an objective assessment of the 
statement itself. Although commentators did not necessarily advo-
cate that one of these factors was definitive, debate was heavy (espe-
cially between those who lean pro-defense and those who lean pro-
prosecution) regarding which factor was “most indicative” of a state-
ment’s testimonial nature.87  
 The declarant-centered approach found considerable support 
among scholars and lower courts.88 Professor Richard Friedman, for 
example, was a leading commentator in support of an approach that 
focused on the declarant’s intent. The Crawford opinion supported 
such an approach in two ways: first, it suggested that a statement 
should be considered testimonial when the declarant would reasona-
bly expect his statement to be used prosecutorially; second, it noted 
that someone making an accusatory statement is “bear[ing] testi-
mony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an ac-
quaintance does not.”89  
 
 85. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. The Court also noted that one arguably testimonial hearsay 
exception was also recognized in 1791, namely dying declarations. See id. at 56 n.6. 
 86. See, e.g., WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6371.2 (identifying multiple ap-
proaches, including declarant-centered approach, government-involvement-centered ap-
proach, and approaches analyzing the statement’s formality and resemblance to disfavored 
civil-law methods); Brooks Holland, What Makes Testimony . . . Testimonial? 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 281 (2005); Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic Definition—The 
Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14 (2005) (declarant-centered approach that 
views the accusatory nature of the statement as dispositive). 
 87.  See Michael H. Graham, Special Report: Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed.2d 177 (2004), 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 4, nn.10-11 (2006) (identifying 
“declarant’s objective intent” and “governmental involvement” as the two main indicators 
and analyzing lower court decisions in terms of whether they view those requirements dis-
junctively or conjunctively).  
 88. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1171, 1240-41 (2002); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Hammon v. Indiana, 
2006 (No. 05-5705), available at 2006 WL 766741 (Professor Friedman’s oral argument be-
fore the Supreme Court in Hammon v. Indiana, argued in tandem with Davis v. Washing-
ton). For lower court decisions embracing the declarant-centered approach, see United 
States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2005), and United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 
223, 228-29 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 89. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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 An approach focusing on the government’s participation in the de-
velopment of the out-of-court statement was also widely touted.90 
Supporters of this view argued that Crawford is not merely (or even 
primarily) concerned with the intent of the declarant; instead, the 
opinion appears to concentrate on the “involvement of government of-
ficers in the production of testimonial evidence.”91 Indeed, the his-
torical recitation in Crawford is replete with warnings against the 
governmental abuse potentially facilitated by testimony that is not 
subject to the protection of cross-examination.92  Justice Scalia spe-
cifically stated, “Involvement of government officers in the produc-
tion of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential 
for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout 
a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”93 One of the 
scholars taking this language to heart and advocating a government-
involvement approach was Professor Michael Graham. He suggested 
measuring the depth of government involvement by looking at the 
formality surrounding the making of the statement and the method-
ology of the questioning itself.94 Another prominent academic, Pro-
fessor Margaret Berger, had anticipated this approach to confronta-
tion analysis in her 1991 article that argued for a “prosecutorial re-
straint” model of Confrontation Clause protection.95
 A student observer, Ariana Torchin, urged a combination of the 
declarant-focused and government-involvement tests. She suggested 
that the critical issue was whether circumstances indicated that the 
declarant had made a “solemn, purposeful statement”96 implicating 
the accused and contended that government involvement was an “es-
sential, though insufficient, element” in the inquiry.97 Further, she 
asserted that “[i]f the accusatory statement was a solemn declara-
 
 90. See e.g., Kenneth Graham, The Revolution Revised: A Guided Tour of Davis v. 
Washington, UCLA PUBLIC LAW SERIES, 2006, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi 
?article=1031&context=uclalaw.  
 91. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. 
 92. Id. at 43-50 (discussing history); id. at 67 (“The Framers . . . knew that judges, 
like other government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the 
people; the likes of the dread Lord Jeffreys were not yet too distant a memory.”). 
 93. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. 
 94. Graham, supra note 90, at 22-24. 
 95. See Berger, supra note 10, at 607-09 (taking the position that a co-conspirator’s 
statements should be presumed inadmissible unless the government introduces a re-
cording that demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the questioning 
was nonsuggestive).  
 96. Ariana J. Torchin, A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis of Testimonial 
Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L.J. 581, 598 (2006) (“[F]or a court to find 
an out-of-court statement testimonial, the declarant need not anticipate that his incrimi-
nating statements will be used as evidence in criminal investigations or judicial proceed-
ings. Rather, all the court needs to ascertain is whether or not the declarant made a sol-
emn, purposeful statement as defined [earlier in her article].”).  
 97. Id. at 607 (emphasis added). 
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tion, and the nondeclarant witness was an agent of the government 
. . . the statement should still not be testimonial unless . . . the state-
ment was elicited for the purpose of proving or establishing facts in a 
judicial proceeding or criminal investigation.”98  
 Another student commentator, John Robert Knoebber, noted the 
shortcomings of all three “formulations” of testimonial statements 
listed in Crawford and advanced what he called the “expanded broad 
objective witness” approach.99 His approach embraced the definition 
promulgated by Professor Friedman on behalf of the NACDL as 
amicus in Crawford, but expanded it to include as testimonial state-
ments those that “a reasonable declarant or a reasonable recipient 
would understand . . . would be used at a later criminal trial.”100 He 
noted that under his proposed formulation, all co-conspirator state-
ments made to undercover law enforcement operatives would be tes-
timonial, because “the reasonable undercover officer either knew or 
should have known that the statement would be used at a later 
trial.” The fact that the declarant would be providing information 
unwittingly would be irrelevant under Knoebber’s definition.101  
 The third mode of analysis focused on the nature of the statement 
itself. This “categorical approach” attempted to rope off certain types 
of statements as being either testimonial or nontestimonial. One au-
thority identified two methods of categorization: “situational” (e.g., 
“all statements made during a pleas allocution are testimonial”) or 
“doctrinal” (e.g., “all business records are nontestimonial”).102  
Categorical analysis, of course, is a bright line approach: once 
statement types are identified as testimonial or not, case-by-case 
examination is unnecessary.  
III.   POST-CRAWFORD APPELLATE COURT RULINGS ON CO-
CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
 Since Crawford was decided, many appellate courts have ad-
dressed challenges from defendants asserting that co-conspirator 
statements were introduced against them in violation of their right 
to confrontation. These courts have used different rationales to arrive 
 
 98. Id. at 598-99. Thus, Torchin’s test for determining whether a statement produced 
by government interrogation is perhaps the closest to our own. 
 99. Knoebber, supra note 10, at 535-36.  
 100. Id. Insofar as Knoebber asserts that his formulation can render statements to 
government agents as listeners testimonial, we agree. His thesis also suggests that the in-
tent of a listener who is not associated with the government can render the statement tes-
timonial; we are not ready to go quite that far. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Graham, supra note 90, at 37. 
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at their decisions, but one thing has been constant: none of them has 
determined that it was error to admit a co-conspirator statement.103
A.   Courts Using Some Form of Blanket Approach 
 In United States v. Saget,104 the Second Circuit squarely held that 
“a declarant’s statements to a confidential informant, whose true 
status is unknown to the declarant, do not constitute testimony 
within the meaning of Crawford.”105 In Saget, the defendant and his 
co-conspirator, Beckham, were paying strippers to purchase hand-
guns for them in Pennsylvania and then were transporting the guns 
to New York and selling them on the black market.106 In mid-2001, 
Beckham had two conversations with a man whom he thought was a 
friend and potential co-conspirator, but was actually a confidential 
informant (CI) who recorded the conversations.107  
 After indicting Saget for conspiracy to traffic in firearms and fire-
arms trafficking, the Government introduced at trial the recorded 
statements between the CI and Beckham.108 Saget was subsequently 
convicted, and he appealed.109 In holding that these types of state-
ments were not testimonial, the Second Circuit based its reasoning 
on two portions of the Crawford opinion: first, it examined Craw-
ford’s examples of what types of testimony comprise the “core class” 
of testimonial statements and determined that the nucleus common 
to all was the declarant’s “knowing responses to structured question-
ing in an investigative environment or a courtroom setting where the 
declarant would reasonably expect that his or her responses might be 
 
 103. For the uniformity of the Circuit Courts of Appeal, see United States v. Under-
wood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1348 n.2 (11th Cir. 2006) (collecting authorities); United States v. 
Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (collecting authorities); United States v. Hei-
jnen, No. CR 03-2072 JB, 2006 WL 1228949, at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 16, 2006) (collecting post-
Crawford rulings that co-conspirator statements are nontestimonial and declaring, “The 
Court has found no Circuit that has taken a contrary view.”); see also United States v. 
Johnson, 440 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Holmes, 406 
F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2005); Saget, 377 F.3d at 223; United States v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536 (8th 
Cir. 2004). For scholarly commentary on point, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 
6371.2 nn.174-79 (collecting authorities). 
 104. 377 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 105. Id. at 229.  
 106. Id. at 225.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. Actually, the prosecutor offered the statements as against penal interest pur-
suant to FRE 804(b)(3) rather than as co-conspirator statements under FRE 801(d)(2)(E), 
probably because he was concerned that the statements may not have satisfied the “in-
furtherance” requirement. Nevertheless, the holding would appear to apply to any state-
ments made unwittingly to an undercover operative. 
 109. Id. Crawford was decided after Saget’s appeal was filed, but before oral argu-
ments were conducted, so the Second Circuit ordered supplemental briefings on whether 
Crawford demanded the suppression of Beckham’s statements.  
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used in future judicial proceedings.”110 The court then applied this 
declarant-centered reasoning111 to Beckham and determined that be-
cause Beckham was unaware that the confidential informant was 
taping their conversations, his statements were not testimonial.112  
 In United States v. Hendricks,113 the Third Circuit addressed a 
similar situation and ruled in a similar fashion. In Hendricks, the de-
fendant and several others were indicted by a federal grand jury sit-
ting in the United States Virgin Islands on multiple counts of con-
spiracy, narcotics possession and distribution, and money laundering.114 
The Government had developed evidence through authorized wiretaps 
and from conversations recorded between some of the defendants and a 
confidential informant, who was murdered before the trial.115  
 The Government sought pretrial rulings on the admissibility of 
the recordings and appealed to the Third Circuit when the district 
court relied on Crawford to exclude them. In doing so, the district 
court stated that Crawford had barred “all out-of-court statements 
made by an unavailable witness whom a defendant has not had the 
chance to cross-examine, with exceptions only for dying declarations 
and forfeiture for wrongdoing.”116 In response to this extremely ex-
pansive reading of Crawford, the Third Circuit followed the Second 
Circuit’s lead from Saget, reasoning that unwitting statements to a 
confidential informant were not testimonial.117
 In United States v. Reyes,118 the Eighth Circuit followed an even 
more direct route to deflect the defendant’s confrontation claim. It 
 
 110. Id. at 228. This interpretation was also relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit, which 
cited Saget with approval on this point. United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1347 
(11th Cir. 2006). 
 111. Saget, 377 F.3d at 229 (“[T]he Court would use the reasonable expectation of the 
declarant as the anchor of a more concrete definition of testimony.” (emphasis added)). 
 112. Id. (“Beckham’s statements [do] not constitute testimony, [because] it is undis-
puted that he had no knowledge of the CI’s connection to investigators and believed that he 
was having a casual conversation with a friend and potential co-conspirator.”). 
 113. 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 114. Id. at 174.  
 115. Id. at 175-76. The government maintained that the defendants murdered the in-
formant after the indictment was returned.  
 116. Id. at 176. This would have been almost as favorable to the defendant as the 
“broad view” of the Confrontation Clause’s scope, noted as being “unintended and too ex-
treme,” supra note 42.  
 117. Id. at 181 (“Even considered in perspective of the broad[est] definition [of “testi-
monial”], the [wiretap] recordings cannot be deemed ‘testimonial’ as the speakers certainly 
did not make the statements thinking that they ‘would be available for use at a later trial.’ ”) 
(internal citations omitted); id. at 182 n.9 (“[T]he . . . defendants . . . certainly did not real-
ize that their statements were going to be used prosecutorially. And [therefore] because 
they constitute admissions unwittingly made, the defendants and coconspirators’ portions 
of the CI Rivera conversations are clearly nontestimonial statements and are thus not sub-
ject to the Crawford rule.” (citing Saget, 377 F.3d at 229-30)); see also United States v. 
Peak, No. 05-510, 2006 WL 1030226 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2006) (relying on Hendricks). 
 118. 362 F.3d 536 (8 th Cir. 2004). 
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cited the language in Crawford in which the majority specifically re-
ferred to co-conspirator statements as an example of nontestimonial 
exceptions to confrontation at the time of the Founding Fathers119 to 
support its assertion that “the Confrontation Clause does not give the 
defendant the right to cross-examine a person who does not testify at 
trial and whose statements are introduced under the co-conspirator 
hearsay exclusion.”120 The court then succinctly stated in a footnote 
that “Crawford does not support [the defendant’s] argument . . . be-
cause co-conspirator statements are nontestimonial.”121 In United 
States v. Underwood,122 the Eleventh Circuit also identified this lan-
guage from Crawford as supporting the conclusion that a co-
conspirator’s statements are nontestimonial.123  
 As noted above, other dicta in Crawford insinuates that casual 
remarks to an acquaintance are not testimonial in nature.124  To this 
end, a number of lower courts have concluded that co-conspirator 
statements resemble such remarks more than they resemble formal 
statements to government actors, even when they are surreptitiously 
recorded by the authorities, and thus they are not testimonial.125  
 Finally, the reader will recall that, in its effort to lessen the im-
pact of its opinion, the Crawford majority favorably cited the out-
come of Bourjaily v. United States.126 A number of circuit courts have 
cited this treatment of Bourjaily in reasoning that the co-conspirator 
exception does not offend the Sixth Amendment.127  
 
 119. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). 
 120. Reyes, 362 F.3d at 541. 
 121. Id. at 540 n.4; see also United States v. Brooks, No. 04-1894, 2006 WL 839024, at 
*7 (1st Cir. Mar. 31, 2006) (“[W]e find statements of co-conspirators to be nontestimonial 
and thereby not subject to Crawford.”). 
 122. 446 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 123. Id. at 1347; see also Wiggins v. State, 152 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. App. 2004) (“Co-
conspirator statements made in the furtherance of a conspiracy are nontestimonial.”). 
 124. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 125. See United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (“A witness ‘who 
makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person 
who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.’ The [wiretap] recordings here at 
issue are much more similar to the latter than the former.” (citation to Crawford omitted)); 
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 In a 2006 decision, the Fifth Circuit also observed Crawford’s guidance as to the “core 
class” of testimonial statements and to the distinction between formal statements and cas-
ual remarks as grounds for ruling that exchanges between CI and co-conspirators were 
properly admitted against defendant. United States v. Crespo-Hernandez, No. 05-10461, 
2006 WL 1307562, at *5-6 (5th Cir. May 9, 2006). 
 126. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).  
 127. See Underwood, 446 F.3d at 1347; Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 183; Saget, 377 F.3d at 
229; United States v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536, 541 (8th Cir. 2004).  
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B.   Courts Treating Co-Conspirator Statements as Potentially 
Testimonial 
 Some courts considering the issue have indicated the belief that, 
in the right circumstances, a co-conspirator statement may be testi-
monial. The first of the cases indicating a crack in the armor was 
United States v. Stewart.128 In this infamous case, Martha Stewart 
was convicted on multiple counts of conspiracy, making false state-
ments, and obstruction of justice stemming from events on December 
27, 2001.129 Essentially, Peter Bacanovic was broker to both Stewart 
and Sam Waksal, CEO of Imclone, a company in which Stewart held 
some stock.130 Informed from inside sources that Imclone’s promising 
anticancer drug was not going to receive FDA approval, Waksal 
called Bacanovic and directed him to dump all of his Imclone stock. 
Through his assistant, Bacanovic then alerted Stewart to Waksal’s 
attempted trading, and Stewart instructed Bacanovic to sell her Im-
clone stock as well. The next day, the bad news about Erbitux was 
announced and Imclone’s stock declined by eighteen percent.131 An 
investigation was launched by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York.132 On appeal, Stewart argued 
that Crawford barred the admissibility of Bacanovic’s various state-
ments to investigators. These statements, allegedly designed to fur-
ther a coordinated plan to thwart the investigation, had been re-
ceived into evidence under the co-conspirator exception to the hear-
say rule.133  
 These facts presented what appeared to be a unique situation, and 
one that was certainly not contemplated by the Crawford Court: Ba-
canovic’s statements were simultaneously testimonial and conspira-
torial.134 So, should they be barred by Crawford or not? Faced with 
this riddle, the Second Circuit first noted that Stewart did not con-
test the admissibility against her of the alleged lies Bacanovic told 
the investigators because these were certainly not offered for “the 
truth of the matter asserted”; the Supreme Court had made clear in 
Crawford that statements offered for a nonhearsay purpose are not 
barred by the Confrontation Clause.135 The court was less certain 
 
 128. 433 F.3d 273, 279 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 129. Id. at 279.  
 130. Id. at 281-83. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 281.  
 133. Id. at 291. Bacanovic made the identical claim regarding the admission of Stewart’s 
statements against him; for purposes of simplicity, we address only Stewart’s contention. 
 134. Id. at 292. 
 135. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“The Clause also does not 
bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted.” (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985))). 
896  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:877 
 
                                                                                                                   
about what to do with those parts of Bacanovic’s statements that 
were truthful. It finally held that “when the object of a conspiracy is 
to obstruct justice . . . truthful statements made to [investigating] of-
ficers designed to lend credence to the false statements and hence 
advance the conspiracy are not rendered inadmissible by the Con-
frontation Clause.”136 The court reasoned that to rule otherwise 
would “def[y] logic, human experience and even imagination” and 
would be “unacceptably ironic.”137 So, though the Second Circuit rec-
ognized that a co-conspirator statement may, indeed, be testimonial, 
in the end it did Martha Stewart no favor. 
 A second noteworthy case is People v. Redeaux.138 In Redeaux, an 
undercover agent posing as a drug purchaser solicited drugs from an 
individual named Johns.139 As the investigation developed, the un-
dercover agent recorded numerous conversations with Johns in 
which Johns repeatedly referenced his “source.” At some point, Johns 
told the agent that the source wanted to be present for the transac-
tion, and the agent suggested that the source sit in Johns’ car while 
the deal went down.140 The person who showed up in Johns’ car to 
consummate the transaction turned out to be Redeaux. At trial, the 
agent’s conversations with Johns were offered and accepted against 
Redeaux as co-conspirator statements.141  
 The Illinois Appellate Court authored a thoughtful opinion ad-
dressing the question whether Johns’ statements were testimonial 
under Crawford and therefore barred by the Confrontation Clause. 
The court noted that because the conversations at issue were be-
tween a conspirator and an undercover agent, they possibly 
amounted to interrogation by the police and therefore might have 
been testimonial.142 Citing Massiah v. United States,143 the Redeaux 
court pointed out that an interrogation can take place even when the 
subject is unaware of the questioner’s law enforcement status.144 The 
court then explored the definition of interrogation—which the Craw-
ford Court did not do because it determined that the questioning in 
that case “qualifie[d] [as interrogation] under any conceivable defini-
tion.”145 The Illinois court referenced Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary for the proposition that to interrogate is “to question for-
 
 136.  Stewart, 433 F.3d at 293. 
 137. Id. at 292-93.  
 138. 823 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  
 139. Id. at 269-70. 
 140. Id. at 269.  
 141. Id. at 270. 
 142.   Id. at 271.  
 143. 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 144. Redeaux, 823 N.E.2d at 271-72.  
 145. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004).  
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mally and systematically.”146 The court held that because the conver-
sations between the agent and Johns never even came close to struc-
tured police questioning, Johns’ resulting statements were not testi-
monial. The court went on: 
The two were merely trying to arrange the details of a drug trans-
action. Although [the agent] asked questions during the conversa-
tions, they were merely to facilitate the sale of the cocaine. [The 
agent] did not press Johns for information beyond what was neces-
sary for that purpose. Notably, although Johns repeatedly referred 
to his “source,” [the agent] did not question him about the source’s 
identity. Johns’ statements were more like casual conversation and 
not in response to “interrogation.”147
Thus, the Redeaux court left open the real possibility that co-
conspirator statements made in the right context might, indeed, be 
barred by the Sixth Amendment.  
IV.   DAVIS V. WASHINGTON148
A.   Facts and Holding 
 The Supreme Court finally gave some additional insight into its 
definition of testimonial in the case of Davis v. Washington. The 
Davis opinion addressed two separate lower court cases involving 
domestic disturbances. In Davis, a 911 emergency operator received 
a call that was immediately terminated.149 The operator called back 
and Michelle McCottry answered. During the ensuing conversation, 
the operator ascertained that McCottry’s boyfriend was creating a 
domestic disturbance. McCottry’s answers were all in the present 
tense, including reporting that “[h]e’s here jumpin’ on me again” and 
“[h]e’s usin’ his fists.”150 The operator proceeded to elicit the defendant’s 
name, after which McCottry reported that he had run out the door. 
While the police were still traveling to the scene, the operator obtained 
more information from McCottry about Davis and the assault.151  
 The other case addressed in Davis was Hammon v. Indiana.152 In 
Hammon, police arrived at the home of Amy Hammon in response to 
a report of a domestic disturbance. Amy was on the front porch when 
they arrived, claiming that nothing was wrong. The police entered 
the house and found her husband Hershel inside. After seeing some 
 
 146. Redeaux, 823 N.E.2d at 271 (citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 611 
(10th ed. 2001)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
 149. Id. at 2270. 
 150.   Id. at 2271.  
 151. Id. at 2270. 
 152. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
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damage to the interior, they investigated further. Eventually, Amy 
filled out an affidavit in which she reported, inter alia, that Hershel 
had broken the furnace, shoved her into the broken glass, hit her in 
the chest, and attacked her daughter.153
 Neither McCottry nor Amy Hammon testified at the criminal trial 
of their abusers. Instead, McCottry’s 911 conversation and Amy’s 
conversation with the police, as well as her subsequent affidavit, 
were admitted at trial. In both cases, lower courts ruled that the ad-
mission of the conversations did not violate the Confrontation Clause 
because they were not testimonial. In the Hammon case, the Indiana 
Supreme Court also held that Amy’s affidavit was, in fact, testimonial, 
but that its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.154
 Davis thus required the Supreme Court, with Justice Scalia once 
again writing for the majority, to answer an oft-asked question left 
open by Crawford: when does the interaction between a hearsay de-
clarant and law enforcement officers constitute interrogation that is 
testimonial for Sixth Amendment purposes? The Court answered this 
question in the following manner: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance 
to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.155
The Court went on to justify this distinction by referring back to the 
definition of testimony found in the 1828 edition of Webster’s Dic-
tionary, which was quoted in Crawford: “a solemn declaration or af-
firmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.”156 It explained that the kind of interrogations it had in mind in 
Crawford were ones “solely directed at establishing the facts of a past 
crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpe-
trator.”157 The Court pointed out that the solemnity of such a state-
ment is “established by the severe consequences that can attend a de-
liberate falsehood.”158 It contrasted this with the moments during a 
911 call when the declarant is describing “events as they were actu-
 
 153. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272. 
 154. Id. at 2273. 
 155. Id. at 2273-74. 
 156. Id. at 2275. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 2276.  
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ally happening,” rather than past events.159 As the Court noted, “[n]o 
‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.”160
 Davis provides considerable help in determining the appropriate 
tack to take in analyzing co-conspirator statements for purposes of 
confrontation analysis. Significantly, the Davis court makes clear 
that Confrontation Clause protection is not directed solely against 
government involvement in the development of out-of-court state-
ments or against a declarant’s accusatory state of mind.161 Rather, 
the Clause is concerned with cases in which either or both factors re-
sult in an out-of-court declarant giving the equivalent of “testimony” 
implicating the accused. Whether the declarant’s statement amounts 
to testimony is to be judged objectively, and the test is whether the 
declarant is providing information regarding past events that is po-
tentially relevant to future criminal prosecution.162 If “the purpose of 
the exercise [is] to nail down the truth about past criminal 
events,”163 the statement is testimonial. On the other hand, if the 
primary purpose of an interrogation is to obtain information for 
some other reason—in Davis, to obtain help in an ongoing emer-
gency—then it is not testimonial.164  
 Unfortunately, in addition to this careful analysis, the Davis opin-
ion once again provides fodder for courts and commentators who be-
lieve that no conceivable set of circumstances could lead to a co-
conspirator statement being considered testimonial. In dicta, the 
Court again cited Bourjaily for the proposition that a statement 
made unwittingly to a government informant is nontestimonial.165 
We believe that this blanket blessing of co-conspirator statements by 
the Court does not match the test set forth in Davis and that the 
Court will narrow its dicta when faced with the right case. 
B.   The Nature of Co-Conspirator Statements 
 Co-conspirator statements are conversations among members of a 
conspiracy, and between conspirators and outsiders, that further the 
 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 2277. 
 161. Id. at 2276-77. 
 162. Id. at 2273-74. 
 163. Id. at 2278. 
 164. Id. at 2273-74. The Davis Court refused to consider whether a statement could be 
testimonial absent any governmental involvement. See id. at 2274 n.2. This is a difficult 
question. Obviously, the lack of governmental involvement in the creation of the statement 
precludes the kinds of government overreaching the Confrontation  Clause is designed to 
fend off. On the other hand, a defendant who faces conviction based on an out-of-court 
statement made in response, say, to an extended interrogation by persons other than gov-
ernment officials still loses the protection of cross-examination of his accuser. Like the 
Davis Court, we leave the resolution of this issue for another day.  
 165. Id. at 2275. 
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objectives of the conspiracy. Because of the in-furtherance require-
ment, many co-conspirator statements make sense only in context; 
they are operative rather than informational. Operative statements 
would include those made by a conspirator arranging a meeting, pur-
chasing the items necessary to commit a crime, or buying or selling 
valuable contraband. Out of context, such statements make no sense. 
Thus, one would not get on the witness stand and arrange a con-
spiratorial meeting or place an order for burglars’ tools or offer to sell 
a kilogram of cocaine. Operative statements, which are the bread and 
butter of co-conspirator communications, are likely what the Su-
preme Court had in mind when citing Bourjaily to support the con-
clusion that co-conspirator statements are not testimonial.166 Indeed, 
under the Davis test, operative statements are clearly not testimo-
nial; like the emergency portion of 911 calls and police reports, the 
purpose of an operative statement is to accomplish an important 
task, not provide information about past criminal activity.  
 However, the in-furtherance requirement is actually very broad, 
encompassing far more than operative statements. A statement is in 
furtherance of a conspiracy if it contributes in any way to the possi-
ble success of the conspiracy in achieving its objectives.167 This in-
cludes not only obviously conspiratorial statements, such as those 
surrounding the planning of the crime, but also more tangential 
statements, such as those made to reassure shaky members or to re-
cruit prospective members to join the criminal enterprise.168 Essen-
tially, courts find the statement to be “in furtherance” if it is more 
than “idle chatter.”169 Statements in furtherance thus might identify 
the big players in the conspiracy, brief a member about the group’s 
past successes, or brag about the sheer scope of the criminal activ-
ity.170 Such statements are routine and are routinely admitted pur-
suant to FRE 801(d)(2)(E) or a state’s equivalent.171
 
 166. See generally id.; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58-59 (2004). 
 167. See Ethel R. Alston, Annotation, Admissibility of Statement by Co-Conspirator 
Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of Federal Rules of Evidence, 44 A.L.R. FED. 627 (1979) (In §10: 
“[C]ourts . . . have indicated that a broad construction must be given to the requirement in 
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) that a co-conspirator’s statement be made in furtherance of the conspir-
acy.”); see also United States v. Garcia-Torres, 280 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002) (“So long as the 
statement is made during the conspiracy, the ‘ “in furtherance” ’ requirement is adminis-
tered flexibly.”); United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 839 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Because of the 
in furtherance limitation on the admissibility of coconspirator’s statement, a damaging 
statement is not admissible under 801(d)(2)(E) unless it tends to advance the objects of the 
conspiracy as opposed to thwarting its purpose.” (emphasis added)).  
 168. See United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 436 (2d Cir. 1994) (“providing informa-
tion or reassurance to a coconspirator” satisfied the in-furtherance requirement). 
 169. See 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 259, text at n.47 (6th ed. 2006).  
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding “in-
furtherance” statements by a co-conspirator that “extolled the benefits of the [illegal] 
scheme, relay[ed] [past] . . . gun-running practices, profits, and past exploits in a manner 
that implicated both himself and [the defendant]”); United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 
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 It is not so clear that informational co-conspirator statements 
should never be treated as testimonial for Confrontation Clause pur-
poses. Under the Davis test, the pertinent questions become: (1) Is 
the statement the result of an “interrogation?” and (2) Is the primary 
purpose of the interrogation to establish or prove past events poten-
tially relevant to later criminal prosecution? These questions are 
taken up in turn. 
V.   WHEN INFORMATIONAL CO-CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS ARE THE 
EQUIVALENT OF TESTIMONY 
 One common investigative tool to develop evidence against mem-
bers of a conspiracy is to infiltrate it with either undercover agents or 
undercover witnesses acting under the supervision of law enforce-
ment agents. The job of the undercover operative is to learn all he 
can about the conspiracy—such as its members and their various 
roles, its methods and goals, its assets, and the locations where it 
meets or carries out operations. For such conversations to be admis-
sible, of course, they must be in furtherance of the conspiracy. But, 
as noted above, that is usually an easy hurdle for the government to 
clear, since the unwitting conspirator is revealing the information 
because he believes, for one reason or another, that such revelations 
will help the conspiracy meet its objectives. 
 In common sense terms, an undercover operative seeking to pump 
information out of a conspirator is conducting a clandestine interro-
gation. To the extent the questions are aimed at prior criminal activ-
ity, in answering them the declarant is providing information regard-
ing “past events [that are] potentially relevant to [future] criminal 
prosecution.”172 Undoubtedly, “the purpose of the exercise [is] to nail 
down the truth about past criminal events.”173  
 The main difference between an undercover interrogation and an 
overt one is that in the latter case the declarant knows he is bearing 
witness and in the former case he does not. But the Davis Court goes 
to great lengths to make clear that the subjective intention of neither 
the interrogator nor the declarant controls whether the resulting 
statement is testimonial.174 The objective purpose of the questioning 
 
450 (6th Cir. 2001) (conversations informing coconspirator of criminal enterprise’s progress 
were “in furtherance”). 
 171. See 2 BROUN, supra note 169, § 259 (discussing how the in-furtherance require-
ment has been construed by courts to admit more evidence than a literal reading of the 
rule would suggest). 
 172. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006). 
 173. Id. at 2278. 
 174. The Davis Court looked not to the declarant’s subjective intent but to the intent of 
an objective listener (“any reasonable listener would recognize that [the declarant] was fac-
ing an ongoing emergency”) and not to the questioner’s subjective intent but to an objective 
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is what matters.175 Thus, the unwitting nature of the declarant’s ac-
tion should not change the outcome. 
 Another difference, perhaps more significant, is that within the 
definition of “testimony” is a notion of solemnity. According to the 
Supreme Court, in the context of police interrogation, the solemnity 
of “even an oral declaration [or statement] of relevant past fact to an 
investigating officer is well enough established by the severe conse-
quences that can attend a deliberate falsehood.”176 In the case of a 
covert interrogation, the declarant is not aware of any official conse-
quences of falsehood and thus arguably is not providing information 
on a solemn occasion. Courts and observers who wish to avoid apply-
ing Davis to co-conspirator statements as a categorical matter will 
likely point to this distinction as crucial. 
 We believe, however, that it is not. It cannot be argued that an in-
dividual who believes he or she is speaking to a co-conspirator is go-
ing to treat the occasion as solemn based upon the possibility of law-
ful sanctions for mistruth. However, that does not mean the occasion 
lacks all solemnity. Rather, when one conspirator briefs another 
about facts pertinent to the success of the conspiracy, it is a solemn 
event because the consequences of lying are likely to be quite dra-
matic—perhaps even death, if the conspiracy enforces internal norms 
in a violent manner. In this sense, then, the co-conspirator can be 
said to be bearing witness. 
 Moreover, determining that co-conspirator statements made to 
undercover agents can be testimonial avoids giving law enforcement 
the perverse motive to obtain as much information as possible 
through undercover means to avoid the constraints of the Sixth 
Amendment.177 If the Court were to hold otherwise, it is not difficult 
to imagine prosecutors purposefully instructing law enforcement 
agents to conduct “undercover interrogations,” because no matter 
how intrusive the government conduct, the pre-arrest statements of 
one conspirator would be admissible against all others. This would be 
the case although the harm to the defendant—the use at trial of a 
government-induced out-of-court statement that provides inculpatory 
evidence against the accused—is the same whether the statement is 
obtained from a witting or unwitting witness. 
 
analysis of the questioning (“the nature of what was asked and answered”) as barometers 
of whether the statement was testimonial. Id. at 2276. 
 175. See id. at 2273-74 (“[Statements] are testimonial when . . . the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”). 
 176. Id. at 2276 (citation omitted). 
 177. See Torchin, supra note 96, at 596 (“[C]oncentrating on whether the statement 
was given during formal ‘interrogation’ . . . gives investigating officers and prosecutors pre-
cisely the wrong incentive, inviting them to avoid ‘whatever procedure is deemed to be a 
critical aspect of formality.’ ” (citation omitted)). 
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 To think that prosecutors will not take advantage of the holes left 
open to them by Davis is to be naïve. They have already started do-
ing so on other fronts. One commentator has noted the proliferation 
of “guidance questionnaires” that are being published and dissemi-
nated by victim’s advocacy groups.178 These questionnaires (for 
crime-scene witnesses, presumably) are checklists that prosecutors 
can use to measure how “testimonial” a battered wife’s statement (for 
example) may be for confrontation purposes. Identifying the relation-
ship between prosecutors and investigators as two players on the 
same team, Torchin notes that “[t]he effect of such a checklist for 
prosecutors, designed for direct examination or pretrial hearings of 
police officers, is to teach the law-enforcement community how to act 
at a crime scene in order to have victim statements be deemed non-
testimonial and hence admissible.”179  
 Not all questioning by undercover operatives of co-conspirators 
about past criminality should be considered interrogation, however. 
The Court in Davis made clear that in certain circumstances, a de-
clarant’s answer to just one question—or his voluntary statement 
made without any questioning at all—might still be testimonial.180 
This is a point with which we have no general disagreement. We con-
tend, however, that when the declarant is unwitting, the nature of 
the questioning itself is critical in determining whether a testimony-
producing interrogation has taken place. Occasional answers to ran-
dom questions among purported acquaintances are a mundane part 
of routine, casual conversation—the kind explicitly singled out as not 
constituting testimony by the Crawford Court.181 This makes sense: 
there is no solemnity implicit in routine conversation. For a conver-
sation about past crime to become serious in nature, the declarant’s 
answers must be given in response to sustained questioning by the 
undercover agent or witness. 
 To summarize, our reading of Crawford and Davis leads us to ad-
vocate a nuanced rule for the admission of co-conspirator statements 
under the Confrontation Clause. First, all operational statements, 
and those aimed at future events, should be admissible—they are 
akin to requests for emergency assistance. Second, casual remarks by 
conspirators should also be admissible, due to Crawford’s specific ex-
clusion of “casual remark[s] to an acquaintance” from the reach of 
the Confrontation Clause.182 Even isolated answers to occasional 
questions asked by an undercover agent or witness about the identity 
of conspirators or past events should not be excluded. But when sus-
 
 178. Id. at 596-97. 
 179. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).  
 180. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1. 
 181. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
 182.  Id.  
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tained questioning of one or more co-conspirators amounts to an in-
terrogation objectively designed to gather evidence about past events, 
any statements given in response should be classified as testimonial, 
and thus their admission should be barred by the Confrontation 
Clause. This test is not perfectly neat and clean, but it is faithful to 
the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence and to the Confrontation 
Clause itself. 
VI.   HISTORICAL ISSUES 
 One potential roadblock that could completely derail the above 
confrontation analysis would be an originalist interpretation of the 
Constitution. This is especially true because Justice Scalia, author of 
both Crawford and Davis, is probably the most faithful adherent to 
originalist thinking of any Justice ever to serve on the Supreme 
Court.183 In short, an originalist approach to the issue would examine 
whether an exception to confrontation existed for co-conspirator 
statements at the time of the enactment of the Sixth Amendment in 
1791. If so, the assumption would be that, by its silence on the matter, 
the constitutional provision was intended by the Framers to leave such 
an exception intact. If that was the original intention of the Framers, it 
cannot be disturbed absent constitutional amendment. 
 This issue was alluded to by the Court in Crawford. According to 
Crawford, business records and statements in furtherance of a con-
spiracy were, in fact, well-established exceptions to the general rule 
of exclusion of hearsay by 1791.184  Justice Scalia states that these 
exceptions were not considered to be in conflict with the Confronta-
tion Clause because they “cover[ ] statements that by their nature 
were not testimonial.”185 Thus, the matter would seem to be closed. 
 But it is not. Professor Graham, for one, has taken Justice Scalia 
to task for using what has been dubbed “law office history” to support 
the conclusions reached in Crawford.186 Regardless of the accuracy of 
that proposition, it appears that Justice Scalia did not undertake a 
 
 183.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 
(1989) (speech in which Justice Scalia promotes originalism and defends it against its crit-
ics, arguing that originalism is effectively the only legitimate method of judicial review); 
see also Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Tri-
umph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 
186-89 (2005) (discussing Justice Scalia’s originalist philosophy); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385, 385 
(2000) (generally taking issue with Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence, but recognizing that 
“Justice Scalia’s unique contribution to constitutional theory has been his jurisprudence 
of ‘original meaning.’ ”). 
 184. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6371.2 nn.24-26.  
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close enough examination of the co-conspirator exception to support 
his open-ended claim. This exception did not mean to the Framers 
what it means to law enforcement, criminal practitioners, and courts 
today, and it is debatable whether the Framers would condone it in 
its current form. United States v. Burr187 is illustrative. As far as his-
torically controversial figures go, Walter Raleigh had nothing on 
Aaron Burr. Three years after fatally wounding Alexander Hamilton 
in a duel, Burr was indicted and tried for treason in 1807, and the 
central evidence against him was a letter of a supposed co-
conspirator.188 The theory of the prosecution’s case was that Burr 
was organizing a private army to aid in the overthrow of the United 
States by attacking New Orleans as a means to cleave the Western 
States from the Eastern ones and that his claims that they were “just 
going to attack Mexico” were merely a cover story.189 In a case that 
hinged on the introduction of co-conspirator statements against the 
accused, Justice Marshall noted the dangers posed to the confronta-
tion right by some of the exceptions developing at common law that 
admitted hearsay: 
[A] man should have a constitutional claim to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in his 
absence, may be evidence against him. I know of no principle in 
the preservation of which all are more concerned. I know none, by 
undermining which, life, liberty and property, might be more en-
dangered. It is therefore incumbent on courts to be watchful of 
every inroad on a principle so truly important.190  
 Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist keyed on this language in his 
Crawford concurrence, citing from this passage in Burr to underscore 
his skepticism of the majority’s newfound distinction between testi-
monial and nontestimonial hearsay.191 Just before citing from Burr, 
the Chief Justice noted, “It is an odd conclusion indeed to think that 
the Framers created a cut-and-dried rule with respect to the admis-
sibility of testimonial statements when the law during their own 
time was not fully settled.”192  
 Even though there was a hearsay exception for co-conspirator 
statements in the early stages of the Republic, it could not be called 
“well settled,” as was the exception for dying declarations identified 
in Crawford.193 Without question, the historical record shows that an 
 
 187. 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,964).  
 188. Id. at 193; 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6356 n.750 (“The precise issue 
before Marshall in Burr’s trial was the admissibility of the statements of an alleged co-
conspirator, one Herman Blennerhasset.”). 
 189. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 201, 203 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,964A). 
 190. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 193. 
 191. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 73 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 56 n.6.  
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agency-theory-based co-conspirator exception had existed for some 
time in English law.194 Justice Marshall’s ruling in Burr, however, 
was that the co-conspirator statements in that case were inadmissi-
ble because the exception is appropriate only if conspiracy is actually 
charged in the indictment.195 Justice Marshall looked to English 
common law to support his decision: 
I have not been able to find in the books a single decision, or a soli-
tary dictum which would countenance the attempt that is now 
made to introduce as testimony the declarations of third persons, 
made in the absence of the person on trial, under the idea of a con-
spiracy, where no conspiracy is alleged in the indictment.196
This limitation on use of the co-conspirator exception is, of course, no 
longer in effect.197 Thus, while a certain version of the co-conspirator 
exception was settled around the time when the Framers adopted the 
Sixth Amendment, it was much more limited than that which exists 
today. One response to an originalist argument against treating some 
co-conspirator statements as testimonial, therefore, is that a thor-
ough historical analysis reveals that the modern use of the co-
conspirator exception is far more extensive than that contemplated 
or condoned by the Framers.198
 The second reason that originalism is no bar in this instance is 
that the modern undercover investigation was unforeseeable during 
the founding of the Republic. In the Framers’ day, there was essen-
tially no such thing as an undercover investigation;199 indeed, organ-
ized, professional police forces did not come onto the scene until 
 
 194. See, e.g., S.M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 94-98 (1829); JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 399-413 (1863). 
 195. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 195. 
 196. Id. at 194. In a later opinion, Justice Marshall reiterated that “in the English 
books generally, the position that the declarations of a person not on trial may be given in 
evidence against a man proved to have been connected with him, is laid down only in cases 
of conspiracy, where the crime is completed without any other open deed.” Id. at 204. 
 197. See Alston, supra note 167 (In §3: “[C]ourts . . . have recognized that Rule 
801(d)(2)(E) is applicable to a co-conspirator’s statement made during the pendency of 
a conspiracy regardless of whether conspiracy has been charged in the indictment” 
and collecting authorities). 
 198.  The majority’s response to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s mention of Burr in his con-
currence left something to be desired: it merely mentioned in a footnote that the majority 
“disagree[d] with the Chief Justice’s reading of the case.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9.  
 For disregarding what is considered to be one of the more important historical Confron-
tation Clause cases, the majority earned Professor Grahams’ ire. See Graham, supra note 
90, at 41 (“Apparently the Court is ‘unaware’ that in 1807, Chief Justice Marshall in the 
trial of Aaron Burr ‘invoked’ the right of confrontation as a ground for excluding the decla-
rations of Herman Blennerhasset, one of Burr’s supposed co-conspirators.”). 
 199. See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 24-25 (1988) 
(explaining that undercover police work in the United States did not get underway until 
the early twentieth century); see also Paula J. Casey, Regulating Federal Prosecutors: Why 
McDade Should Be Repealed, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 414-16 (2002). 
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around the Civil War.200 In the minds of the Framers, therefore, co-
conspirator statements did not, by their very nature, entail any 
measure of government involvement in their creation; thus, there 
was no need to protect against official interrogation of unwitting con-
spirators. Additionally, co-conspirator statements were almost all op-
erative in nature and could not be recreated on the witness stand. To 
the Framers, then, the idea of a co-conspirator “bearing witness” was 
just silly. That is not, of course, the case in the present day.  
VII.   APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED RULE TO PRIOR CASES 
 Thus, the rule proposed in Part V survives originalist analysis. 
We believe that it is also a workable rule, and one that will leave un-
disturbed the government’s ability to ferret-out crime through the 
use of undercover investigative tools. First, it simply will not come 
into play unless the statements at issue were elicited by an agent of 
the government. Second, it does not bar the admission of operative 
statements, which constitute a large part of co-conspirator communi-
cation in furtherance of the criminal activity. Finally, it will only im-
pede the admission of co-conspirator statements that are the product 
of sustained interrogation by an undercover operative attempting to 
ascertain facts about past criminal activity. 
 Applying the proposed rule to the facts of prior cases helps to clar-
ify its operation. Therefore, this task is carried out below.  
A.   United States v. Inadi 
 The reader will recall that Inadi201 was the first post-Roberts case 
to uphold the constitutionality of admitting co-conspirator state-
ments.202 In Inadi, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to 
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. The evidence showed 
that his role in the conspiracy was to supply cash and chemicals for 
the manufacture of the drug and to oversee its distribution. Local po-
lice obtained a warrant to search a manufacturing site and surrepti-
tiously remove two pans of the drug. Later, they lawfully wire-tapped 
a phone and intercepted participants in the conspiracy speculating 
about how the methamphetamine had disappeared. These conversa-
tions were offered against Inadi at trial. The trial court ruled that 
the statements in them were admissible because they were made 
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy under FRE 
801(d)(2)(E).203  
 
 200. See MARX, supra note 199, at 23 (noting that large American cities did not have 
uniformed municipal police departments until the 1850s).  
 201. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).  
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53. 
 203. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 390. 
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 The statements in Inadi would not be testimonial under our pro-
posed rule for two reasons. First, they were not made to law en-
forcement; second, they were all apparently operational—trying to 
figure out what had happened for the purpose of protecting the con-
spiracy from detection. Thus, Inadi would be an easy case, decided 
the same way under our Crawford-based rule as under Roberts. 
B.   Bourjaily v. United States 
 Bourjaily,204 of course, is the case the Supreme Court cited in both 
Crawford and Davis for the proposition that co-conspirator state-
ments are nontestimonial.205 It thus deserves special attention, as 
our test would be that much stronger if it comports with existing Su-
preme Court dicta. 
 In Bourjaily, an informant working for the FBI arranged to sell a 
kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed to find indi-
viduals to distribute the drug. In a conversation that was recorded by 
the FBI, Lonardo stated that he had a “gentleman friend” who had 
some questions about the cocaine. Later, the informant spoke to the 
friend about the cocaine’s quality and price. They arranged for the 
sale to take place in a designated hotel parking lot, with Lonardo ac-
cepting the drug and then transferring it to the friend. The deal went 
down, and the “friend” turned out to be Bourjaily.206
 At trial, the Government introduced Lonardo’s recorded conversa-
tions about the “friend” over Bourjaily’s objection. They were admit-
ted as co-conspirator statements.207  
 Bourjaily presents a slightly closer case than Inadi because the 
statements at issue were made to an informant acting under the su-
pervision of law enforcement. But it is still an easy case, for two rea-
sons: (1) the statements are clearly operative, all relating to a future 
transaction and not past criminal conduct, and (2) the statements are 
not the result of sustained questioning by the informant. Thus, our pro-
posed test is consistent with the Court’s reference to Bourjaily as a case 
in which the co-conspirator statements were not testimonial in nature. 
C.   People v. Redeaux 
 The facts of People v. Redeaux208 are set out above.209  Redeaux 
presents essentially the same situation as Bourjaily. As in Bourjaily, 
the statements in Redeaux were made to an undercover agent. Al-
though they were extensive, they were all operational, encompassing 
 
 204. 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. 
 206. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 173-74. 
 207. Id. at 174.  
 208. 823 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41. 
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the negotiation and consummation of a drug deal. Moreover, they 
were not made in response to structured questioning, and they were 
not aimed at learning about prior criminal activity. Thus, they were 
not testimonial. The Redeaux court reached this conclusion, but it in-
timated that just a little bit of questioning by the agent—such as in-
quiring about the name of Johns’ source—might have produced a dif-
ferent outcome.210 We would beg to differ. To preserve the govern-
ment’s ability to investigate and prosecute criminal enterprises 
through infiltration, our test makes clear that before questioning in 
the undercover setting becomes an interrogation, it must be sus-
tained, structured, and directed to the past. Even if the agent sought 
to learn the identity of Johns’ source, this would not come close to be-
ing an interrogation under our analysis. 
D.   United States v. Stewart 
 The Stewart case presents perhaps the most interesting Confron-
tation Clause/co-conspirator statement challenge. As set out in detail 
above,211 the statements in that case were made in response to formal 
law enforcement interrogations. At the same time, they constituted 
co-conspirator statements because they were designed to advance a 
preconceived agreement to obstruct and impede the due administra-
tion of justice. The Second Circuit held that even the truthful por-
tions of the statements were admissible without offending the defen-
dant’s confrontation rights because, in the unique setting in which 
the answers to the interrogation are part and parcel of the crime it-
self, it would defy common sense to hold otherwise.212  
 We believe that the Second Circuit decided the Stewart case cor-
rectly, but for the wrong reasons. Bacanovic’s statements were classi-
cally testimonial and, in the right circumstances, their use against a 
criminal defendant who lacked the opportunity to cross examine him 
would undoubtedly offend the Constitution. Consider, for example, 
the situation in which an individual who is being interrogated about 
a homicide laces his answers with lies to further a predetermined 
scheme to obstruct justice and protect the murderer. Nevertheless, 
authorities put the alleged murderer on trial. Prosecutors believe 
that, despite the lies, portions of the co-conspirator’s out-of-court 
statement implicate the defendant. They offer these in evidence. 
Should they be permitted because they are part and parcel of the 
obstruction crime? 
 
 210. See Redeaux, 823 N.E.2d at 271 (“[The undercover agent] did not press [the coconspira-
tor] for information beyond what was necessary [to facilitate the sale of the cocaine.]”). 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33. 
 212. Stewart, 433 F.3d at 292-93. 
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 The answer, of course, is no. The reason is that in the murder 
trial, the statements are being used solely for the truth of the mat-
ters asserted and they were made in a setting that leaves no doubt 
about their testimonial nature.  The fact that they also happen to be 
co-conspirator statements is irrelevant. To be faithful to Crawford, the 
defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  
 How is the Stewart case different? The reason is this: none of Ba-
canovic’s out-of-court statements, even the truthful portions, were of-
fered for the truth of the matters asserted therein. Presumably, the 
government proved all necessary facts—other than the defendants’ 
lies—through witnesses other than Stewart and Bacanovic them-
selves.213 The truthful portions of Bacanovic’s statements were of-
fered for a variety of nonhearsay purposes: at the very least, to put 
the lies into context, to show how Bacanovic and Stewart were savvy 
enough to interlace lies with truth, and to demonstrate how Bacano-
vic’s and Stewart’s stories matched each other. None of these is a 
hearsay purpose, and so none offends the Confrontation Clause. 
Note, however, that if the prosecution had attempted to use a fact 
elicited from Bacanovic against Stewart for the truth it asserted, its 
admission would have offended the Clause—just as in the case of the 
murder prosecution discussed above. 
 The Second Circuit came ever so close to understanding why its 
instincts were right when it stated: 
The essence of a[n obstruction] conspiracy necessarily contem-
plates that the conspirators would provide false information to 
government agencies during the course of their investigation and 
during interrogations that would produce testimonial statements 
of one or the other of them. It defies logic, human experience and 
even imagination to believe that a conspirator bent on impeding an 
investigation by providing false information to investigators would 
lace the totality of that presentation with falsehoods on every sub-
ject of inquiry. To do so would be to alert the investigators imme-
diately that the conspirator is not to be believed, and the effort to 
obstruct would fail from the outset. . . . The truthful portions of 
statements in furtherance of the conspiracy . . . are intended to 
make the false portions believable and the obstruction effective.214
The court’s next sentence is where it went astray: “Thus, the truthful 
portions are offered, not for the narrow purpose of proving merely the 
truth of those portions, but for the far more significant purpose of 
showing each conspirator’s attempt to lend credence to the entire tes-
timonial presentation and thereby obstruct justice.”215 The word 
 
 213. See id. at 294-95 (refusing to reverse even if challenged statements had been er-
roneously admitted because of overwhelming weight of other evidence against defendants). 
 214. Id. at 292. 
 215. Id. 
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“merely” is the problem. The court seems to think that simply be-
cause it is addressing truthful portions of the declarant’s testimony, 
part of the purpose in offering such portions must be for their truth. 
But that, of course, is not the case. Even a truthful statement, offered 
for something other than the truth of the matter asserted, is not 
hearsay. Indeed, it is probably safe to say that most statements of-
fered for a nonhearsay purpose are truthful. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 Crawford and Davis mark a monumental shift in the Supreme 
Court’s Confrontation Clause analysis. Although the outcome has not 
brought the certainty promised by the Crawford opinion, it appears 
that the new paradigm will do a good job in protecting core confron-
tation values—a much better job than the malleable Roberts v. Ohio 
test accomplished by essentially mimicking the hearsay rule and its 
exceptions. However, the full promise of Crawford will not be 
achieved if courts seek to short-cut serious analysis by setting up and 
applying arbitrary bright lines to distinguish testimonial from non-
testimonial out-of-court statements. This is true not only for co-
conspirator statements, but for statements traditionally admitted 
through other hearsay exceptions as well.216 The task of applying the 
test set forth in Davis—and new ones that are inevitably going to 
surface if the courts do their job—is well worth the effort. It will re-
sult in meaningful protection for criminal defendants against being 
accused by individuals whose stories cannot be tested by cross-
examination. In the current era of ever-narrowing rights for criminal 
defendants, reaffirming the law’s commitment to this one layer of 
protection whenever warranted seems to be the least we can do to 
promote justice. 
 This Article does not propose that all—or even most—co-
conspirator statements are testimonial—only that they can be, and 
should be, given individualized analysis. If, and only if, a co-
conspirator statement is the product of sustained questioning by an 
undercover agent or other government operative and it contains in-
formation about prior criminal activity, should it be considered tes-
timonial and thus subject to exclusion under the Sixth Amendment.  
 
 
 216.  See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Treatment of Prosecution Hearsay Under Craw-
ford v. Washington: Some Good News, But . . . , 28 OCT. CHAMP. 16 (2004); Knoebber, supra 
note 10, at 521 (“The categorical approach has failed to produce consistent results in at 
least eight of the following areas that Crawford left unresolved [including] co-conspirator 
statements to undercover officers or informants.”). 
